RUSSIA DISAPPOINTED BY AMERICA

 From the fall of USSR to the II Afghan war

 из распада СССР до II Афганской войне

 Dalla caduta dell'URSS alla II Guerra dell' Afganistan

 De la chute de l'URSS à la II Guerre d'Afganistan

 Seit dem Fall der UdSR bis zum zweiten afganischen Krieg

Since Europe had not allowed for a long time  (1989-2004) East Europeans to enter  the Union , during the meantime the latter   cared much more the relationships with the US and with  NATO, with whom things seemed to go on much faster.

This gave rise to a new problem. Thanks to the adhesion to NATO of many East European countries, the American Army was moving nearer and nearer to the core of Russia, what ran contrary to the deepest rooted requirements of any Russian government, as well as to the informal agreements reached when the Soviet Union withdraw the Red Army from Eastern Europe. Throughout the centuries, Russia has accumulated a series of strategic convictions, focussed on the idea that its territory is very exposed to foreign attacks, and that, therefore, a series of precautions have to be taken. Historical experience, including Mongol, Tatar, Polish, Swedish, French, German, British, American, Japanese and  Czech, invasions, have  shown that this is not just paranoia, but a matter of fact.

The first of these precautions had been the one  to have, if not satellites, at least friendly or neutral states, surrounding Russia's borders. Such States had been, over the centuries, the Cossack Republics, Finland, Poland, Persia,  the Muslim Emirates, Sweden, Austria, Afganistan,  Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Outer Mongolia,   the Warsaw Pact States,Yugoslavia, North Korea, Syria, a.s.o.. Now, if precisely some of those states host the military bases of Russia’s most likely military foes, all security of the country vanishes, and Russia must devote a larger and larger part of its resources to a continuous preparation for war. By the way, Gorbatschev mantains that he had been persuaded, by Americans, that this would not have happened if he had withdrawn his troups. Now, at the contrary, it is precisely what was happening. Russia felt encircled and threatened, in a period in which many other countris started to feel  desillusioned by America.

After World War II, America had presented herself as a “status quo power”, which had helped the entire world to repeal the attack of Nazism, and which would have been ready to go on helping everybody to repeal communism (two “revolutionary” forces), precisely because they were aggressive worldwide movements that threatened the peaceful life and the independence of the peoples. The USA  were   very attentive, in that period,  not to give  to anybody the impression to be, themselves, a “revolutionary” power,  which would have been  kin  to aggress foreign nations for ideological reasons, i.e. for imposing, onto them, certain political principles and/or  military alliances. This “neutral” attitude of the USA seemed  confirmed, at that time, by the fact that America was friendly not just  with Western-style democracies, but also with a set of completely different States, such as Maoist China, Hiberian  and South American fascist dictatorships, Islamic kingdoms and republics and any other kind of regimes all over the world.

Unfortunately, as soon as the Soviet “threat” disappeared, the attitude of America started to change. America started waging wars against several States (Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan) purportedly for curbing their violations of international law, but, substantially,  but just because their political orientations or their strategical interests conflicted with the ones of the USA.

Among  the  States which were obliged to reconsider their relationships with America, there were, in first instance, Russia and China, but also France and Germany had serious reasons of disagreement.

Moreover, the West had also promised to help economically Russia to overcome the impending economic crisis, but this did not succeeed. 

The history of foreign relationships of Russia during the Eltzin period is  complex. At the beginning, Eltzin and his followers acted according to what has been called “political romanticism”. They had believed seriously what Americans and Europeans had told Gorbatschev during the Perestrojka period - i.e. that they were enchanted that Russians were making their own reforms and freeing their “satellites”, that Europe and the West were part of a great brotherhood, and that, once Russia would have followed the Western schemes, it would become very rich and very influential worldwide, inside this large brotherhood-.

So, Eltzin and his government retired completely their troops from the former “satellites”, and, partially, also from the former Soviet Republics; they reduced drastically military expenditures; they accepted foreign consultants for transforming Russia’s economy; they decentralized power to the regions and to autonomous Republics and Provinces.

The result of all that was that the economy got worse and worse, causing a dramatical fall in the standards of living, and even in life expectation; uprisings took place in Chechnya and the neighbouring territories;  civil wars exploded in Georgia,  Moldova and former Yugoslavia; Russians and their Serb allies were obliged to flee by millions from certain  Republics; Russia-friendly autonomous Republics, such as Abkhasia, Ossetia or Transnistria, were exposed to assaults by their former "titular" nationalities; millions of immigrants arrived in Russia from former Soviet Republics.

At that moment, Eltzin was obliged to reconsider, at least partially, his policy, slowing down privatizations and  fighting youghly  in Chechnya and in Moldova. The results of all that remained modest. The economy got worse and worse,  oligarchs started to grab larger and larger slices  of national finance and strategic industries, and Russia was obliged to grant some form of independence to Chechnya.

In the last period of Eltzin’s Government, the situation became even worse.  Oligarchs had started transferring abroad their shares in strategic public companies, including defense and gas, and wahhabite guerrillas, not satisfied with the independence of Chechnya, used the latter as a basis for attacking other Republics. Last, but not least, NATO attacked Serbia, an old friend of Russia, for helping Kosovo Albanians, and Eltzin was obliged to send some tenths of tanks to Kosovo for protecting ethnic Serbs.

Bombing Serbia was a very tragic experience for many Europeans, which had dreamed that, with 1989, all of Europe should had become only one country, and, now, saw themselves obliged, on the contrary,  to participate in shelling a Central European capital.

All of that lead to a change in the official and people's view of America, from a model to imitate and an ally to rely on , to a hostile power, erodingv the sovereignty, the unity, the riches and the development prospects of Russia.

What appears suspicious is that, when the Soviet Union was the State which lied the farthest from the American way of life (a party dictatorship, a State-Owned economy, a military bloc covering one half of the Globe), the USA had no difficulty in dealing with the USSR, but, since Russia has adopted democracy and free market,an has withdrawn the former Soviet troops, it has started to be considered suspect and anti-democratic.And, paradoxically, this is increased since Russia has been able to recover its economic and political strength.

Now, with the tentative Perezagruzka, this impression could vanish. However, the present difficulties in founding a joint solution for the problem of anti-ballistic missiles risks to reinvigorate mutual diffidence.