OUR COMMON MISTAKES (1979-2008)

The Shelling of Belgrade

Europe has Lost 30 Years 

Европа потеряла 30 лет 

L'Europa ha sprecato 30 anni

L'Europe a perdu 30 ans

Europa hat 30 Jahre verpasst

The path towards European Identity is unbelievably slow. Moreover, it seems to progress not by way of a consistent and conscious path, but, on the contrary, mainly  via a process of trial and error. Also the way  toward a new  self-consciousness of Russia is proceeding  slowly and in a contradictory way.

For Europeans at the time of World War II and of Cold War, “Russia” was just a synonym for “Communism” - what was false also then (see: “White Guards”, Vlassov Army, the “patriotic” character impressed, to the War, by Stalin himself). Because of this wrong characterization, most Europeans conceived their attitude towards Russia, at that time, just alongside their own ideological preferences or refusals.

At a later stage, let say during the period of Khruschev’s “Peaceful Coexistence”period, in the Sixties, Europeans were interested to Russia especially for business (see the Lada plant of Togliatti) , and, also, for some, rare, cultural products which arrived to us: some novels, like Doctor Zivago, or some films, like Cistoe Nebo.

“Russia-Bashing” was becoming general in the Seventies: from the side of anti-communists, but also of the left, which denounced a “Treason of Socialism”. In Eastern Europe, Russians were identified with the Soviet Union, and, also there, for this reason, they were submerged by general suspicion.

At the moment of Perestrojka, Europeans were not inclined to a rational attitude towards the proposals expressed by Gorbatschev, whom they did not understand. They could not even have imagined that Russians loved Europeans and would have been happy to coordinate with them their future destinies.

Therefore, there was no real enthusiasm for Gorbatschev. Even the events in Eastern Europe were not so clearcut as they are described, retrospectively, now. The struggle was not between communists and anti-communists, but, on the contrary, between different fractions of the former establishment, with a weak contribution of dissidents which, by and large, could not be defined as “anti-communists”.

Finally, one of the most powerful drivers of the change has been precisely Russia, which at the end supported Gorbatschev  and Eltzin in their choice to overcome Communism.

Only when plays were over without its contribution, the West started to intervene with its rhetoric of “the re-conquered freedom”and its pretension to impose its choices. And, paradoxically, West Europeans were not in a hurry to welcome East Europeans in general among them. This is true both for peoples of Central-Eastern Europe, and for the ones of the Former Soviet Union.

The population in the West did not know anything about Eastern Europeans, but one fact: "they are poor, they need money". What West Europeans did not perceive then, and has not yet perceived now, is that, beyond the contingency of financial aids, Perestrojka was opening up, to Western Europe, an extraordinary opportunity, both in economics, and in politics. It was, and is,  precisely the opportunity to achieve the necessary complementarities and economies of scale, and to become strong enough to become a  real player  on the world scene.

Thus, Western Europe committed three major mistakes: submitting the countries of Central-Eastern Europe to  bothersome membership procedures, so alienating the sympathies of Eastern Europeans and giving time to all Euroskeptical tendencies (small nationalisms, American lobbies, even jihadism), to organize and to gain momentum, precisely thanks to the absence of Europe. This is the explanation of Nagorno-Karabagh, of Transnistria, of former Yugoslavia. Allowing Enlargement of NATO before the one od European Union. Excluding Russia and Turkey.

Europeans were persuaded that, making Europe with  the East meant undertaking huge responsibilities and the need to engage themselves much more in depth. Understanding that would have disturbed their comfortable way of life life,  they preferred to ignore the problem.

The US,  at the times of George Bush Senior, had been very cautious towards the new developments in the East, being afraid to open a space to new phenomena which they considered more dangerous, for them,  than Communism itself, (like for instance  German and Russian nationalisms)  saw , at the end of the day, that neither nationalism had materialized.Then, they felt free to follow an  agenda,  of cultural, political, military and economic “annexation” of Central Europe and of Russia to their tighter sphere of influence. Europe did not show any sign of concern  about that.

Also the Roman Catholic Church, which, at least in theory, had interpreted the evolutions in the East not just as a revolt against communism, but also as a revolt against saecularization, did not draw from that point  its  correct consequences, which woul have implied to continue, in another form,  the old struggle of Solidarność, in the same direction, but, this time, not against Communism, but against the dictature of economy, proper to the West. Pope John Paul II often preached that concept, but did not implement it.

Also the East made several mistakes. Gorbatschev pretended to transform communism into social-democracy without neither any effort to draw the of the consequences from a marxist point of view, nor any program of ideological change, nor any written guarantees from the West. Also Eltzin showed a  blindfolded confidence in the West, giving to foreigners free access to the most precious Russian resources.

Yugoslav leaders started a suicidal war of all against all, without understanding that this would have ruined all the Republics for many decades at the same time.

The Polish Leadership and the Catholic Church forgot every  point of Solidarnosc program, and, instead of  complying with Walesa's promise "to build up a society which would have been better than East and West", simply copied the Western, if not the American, standards.

All other East Europeans took that occasion for starting a mutual and generalised conflict without any serious  objective, a conflict which, in many case, has not ceased up to now. Above all, they had not understood that Europe should be an opportunity for counting more all together, not to spoil each one's neighbours.

Now, Europe is shaken, also because of those mistakes, by a series new crises: the financial, but also a political one, created by xenofoby, separatism and lack of vision, a social one, with the lack of motivation of the youth, and a spiritual one, with the abandonment of any kind of serious engagement. 

The past mistakes should have teached  us what we shall not absolutely repeat. 

According to us, the first lesson  to be learnt is that we need much more culture and much more political debate about these themes.

Just culture shall allow us to understand the historical moment in which we live, our most dramatical problems, the possible solutions, the role of Europe in the world.

East-West cultural exchange is the focal point of this required culture. For this reason we are insisting on this concept.

The initiative "Starting Again, from Culture", and the manifesto "The World of Culture against the Jettison of European Ideal", initiated by the associations of the City of Torino,  are aimed at this goal. Following to the launching of thisd blog, we will launch parallel initiatives specifically devoted to the East-West dialogue.

RUSSIA DISAPPOINTED BY AMERICA

 From the fall of USSR to the II Afghan war

 из распада СССР до II Афганской войне

 Dalla caduta dell'URSS alla II Guerra dell' Afganistan

 De la chute de l'URSS à la II Guerre d'Afganistan

 Seit dem Fall der UdSR bis zum zweiten afganischen Krieg

Since Europe had not allowed for a long time  (1989-2004) East Europeans to enter  the Union , during the meantime the latter   cared much more the relationships with the US and with  NATO, with whom things seemed to go on much faster.

This gave rise to a new problem. Thanks to the adhesion to NATO of many East European countries, the American Army was moving nearer and nearer to the core of Russia, what ran contrary to the deepest rooted requirements of any Russian government, as well as to the informal agreements reached when the Soviet Union withdraw the Red Army from Eastern Europe. Throughout the centuries, Russia has accumulated a series of strategic convictions, focussed on the idea that its territory is very exposed to foreign attacks, and that, therefore, a series of precautions have to be taken. Historical experience, including Mongol, Tatar, Polish, Swedish, French, German, British, American, Japanese and  Czech, invasions, have  shown that this is not just paranoia, but a matter of fact.

The first of these precautions had been the one  to have, if not satellites, at least friendly or neutral states, surrounding Russia's borders. Such States had been, over the centuries, the Cossack Republics, Finland, Poland, Persia,  the Muslim Emirates, Sweden, Austria, Afganistan,  Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Outer Mongolia,   the Warsaw Pact States,Yugoslavia, North Korea, Syria, a.s.o.. Now, if precisely some of those states host the military bases of Russia’s most likely military foes, all security of the country vanishes, and Russia must devote a larger and larger part of its resources to a continuous preparation for war. By the way, Gorbatschev mantains that he had been persuaded, by Americans, that this would not have happened if he had withdrawn his troups. Now, at the contrary, it is precisely what was happening. Russia felt encircled and threatened, in a period in which many other countris started to feel  desillusioned by America.

After World War II, America had presented herself as a “status quo power”, which had helped the entire world to repeal the attack of Nazism, and which would have been ready to go on helping everybody to repeal communism (two “revolutionary” forces), precisely because they were aggressive worldwide movements that threatened the peaceful life and the independence of the peoples. The USA  were   very attentive, in that period,  not to give  to anybody the impression to be, themselves, a “revolutionary” power,  which would have been  kin  to aggress foreign nations for ideological reasons, i.e. for imposing, onto them, certain political principles and/or  military alliances. This “neutral” attitude of the USA seemed  confirmed, at that time, by the fact that America was friendly not just  with Western-style democracies, but also with a set of completely different States, such as Maoist China, Hiberian  and South American fascist dictatorships, Islamic kingdoms and republics and any other kind of regimes all over the world.

Unfortunately, as soon as the Soviet “threat” disappeared, the attitude of America started to change. America started waging wars against several States (Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan) purportedly for curbing their violations of international law, but, substantially,  but just because their political orientations or their strategical interests conflicted with the ones of the USA.

Among  the  States which were obliged to reconsider their relationships with America, there were, in first instance, Russia and China, but also France and Germany had serious reasons of disagreement.

Moreover, the West had also promised to help economically Russia to overcome the impending economic crisis, but this did not succeeed. 

The history of foreign relationships of Russia during the Eltzin period is  complex. At the beginning, Eltzin and his followers acted according to what has been called “political romanticism”. They had believed seriously what Americans and Europeans had told Gorbatschev during the Perestrojka period - i.e. that they were enchanted that Russians were making their own reforms and freeing their “satellites”, that Europe and the West were part of a great brotherhood, and that, once Russia would have followed the Western schemes, it would become very rich and very influential worldwide, inside this large brotherhood-.

So, Eltzin and his government retired completely their troops from the former “satellites”, and, partially, also from the former Soviet Republics; they reduced drastically military expenditures; they accepted foreign consultants for transforming Russia’s economy; they decentralized power to the regions and to autonomous Republics and Provinces.

The result of all that was that the economy got worse and worse, causing a dramatical fall in the standards of living, and even in life expectation; uprisings took place in Chechnya and the neighbouring territories;  civil wars exploded in Georgia,  Moldova and former Yugoslavia; Russians and their Serb allies were obliged to flee by millions from certain  Republics; Russia-friendly autonomous Republics, such as Abkhasia, Ossetia or Transnistria, were exposed to assaults by their former "titular" nationalities; millions of immigrants arrived in Russia from former Soviet Republics.

At that moment, Eltzin was obliged to reconsider, at least partially, his policy, slowing down privatizations and  fighting youghly  in Chechnya and in Moldova. The results of all that remained modest. The economy got worse and worse,  oligarchs started to grab larger and larger slices  of national finance and strategic industries, and Russia was obliged to grant some form of independence to Chechnya.

In the last period of Eltzin’s Government, the situation became even worse.  Oligarchs had started transferring abroad their shares in strategic public companies, including defense and gas, and wahhabite guerrillas, not satisfied with the independence of Chechnya, used the latter as a basis for attacking other Republics. Last, but not least, NATO attacked Serbia, an old friend of Russia, for helping Kosovo Albanians, and Eltzin was obliged to send some tenths of tanks to Kosovo for protecting ethnic Serbs.

Bombing Serbia was a very tragic experience for many Europeans, which had dreamed that, with 1989, all of Europe should had become only one country, and, now, saw themselves obliged, on the contrary,  to participate in shelling a Central European capital.

All of that lead to a change in the official and people's view of America, from a model to imitate and an ally to rely on , to a hostile power, erodingv the sovereignty, the unity, the riches and the development prospects of Russia.

What appears suspicious is that, when the Soviet Union was the State which lied the farthest from the American way of life (a party dictatorship, a State-Owned economy, a military bloc covering one half of the Globe), the USA had no difficulty in dealing with the USSR, but, since Russia has adopted democracy and free market,an has withdrawn the former Soviet troops, it has started to be considered suspect and anti-democratic.And, paradoxically, this is increased since Russia has been able to recover its economic and political strength.

Now, with the tentative Perezagruzka, this impression could vanish. However, the present difficulties in founding a joint solution for the problem of anti-ballistic missiles risks to reinvigorate mutual diffidence.